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‘Poles of the World Unite’: the transnational history of the 1929 World Congress of Poles 
abroad in the context of interwar Soviet-Polish rivalries 
 
In the autumn of 1925, the leaders of various Polish civil society organisations working in the 
field of migration and diaspora (Polonia) suggested a novel idea for organising a general 
meeting of Polish minority representatives. An organising committee of the ‘Congress of Poles 
abroad’ was quickly set up with the task of ensuring that this future congress would help 
identify the cultural needs of Poles residing outside of Poland’s borders, and propose strategies   
for bringing them into closer alliance with the Polish government (Pamiętnik, 1930, 15-16). 
The idea of a congress received full support from the Polish authorities, with and invitations to 
join being signed by its Honorary committee members: Marszałek of the Polish Sejm Maciej 
Rataj and Marszałek the Senate Wojciech Trąmpczyński (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2935, 
ark.45-46). According to an information circular sent out to various Polish associations in other 
countries, the list of themes for discussion included problems facing Poles living abroad, their 
rights in their countries of residence, access to education in their mother tongue, and their 
cultural life abroad. The aim of establishing closer links among Poles throughout the world 
was also reflected in the Congress slogan – ‘Strength in Unity’ (‘W Jedności Siła’). The  flyer 
concluded with a greeting from the organisers: ‘The motherland (ojczyzna) will welcome you 
as a mother welcomes  her children’ (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2246, ark.64-65). 
The First Congress of Poles abroad took place on 14-21 July 1929, two years later than initially 
planned. In early June 1929, information about the upcoming congress appeared in the Soviet 
Polish-language press — Moscow-based newspaper Trybuna Radziecka (Soviet Tribune) and 
Ukraine’s Sierp (Sickle) —thus initiating the information campaign surrounding the elections 
for the Soviet delegation to the Congress. In less than a month, some fifty regional and city 
conferences all over Ukraine were held in order to select candidates for the all-Ukrainian 
conference scheduled for 2 July 1929. During this event five candidates, representing a total of 
476,435 Poles were elected. Together with five approved delegates from Soviet Belarus and 
four from Russia, they were subsequently issued with passports and applied for visas to travel 
to Warsaw. Nonetheless, when the Congress opened on 14 July, none of the Soviet delegates 
were present. The Soviet delegation had been denied participation in the Congress of Poles 
abroad. The Lithuanian delegation was the only other national group absent from the Congress, 





What might this episode tell us about Soviet-Polish relations in the late 1920? How did these 
foreign considerations influence both countries domestic policies? Most importantly, what role 
did minorities come to play in the on-going Soviet-Polish rivalry? Based on a thorough analysis 
of primary sources collected in the archives in Kyiv and Warsaw, as well as other previously 
published sources, this article offers a transnational history of the 1929 Congress of Poles 
abroad, scrutinising Polish and Soviet perspectives on the event, as well as its perceived 
potential to mobilise their minority populations. While Polish planning for the Congress 
provides a necessary context (Wrzesiński, 1975, 1979; Albin, 1981; Lusinski, 1998), this article 
will primarily focus on the election of delegates from Soviet Ukraine and the prevention of 
their participation by the Polish authorities (Iwanow, 1991; Życki 2007; Ieremenko, 1993; 
Zarets’ka, 2006). 
Interwar Polish-Soviet, as well as Polish-Ukrainian, relations have received considerable 
scholarly attention. In particular, two avenues of enquiry can be distinguished. The first deals 
with Soviet and Polish security policies, as well as anxieties about foreign threats and fears of 
subversion, with the Polish-Soviet borderland being at the centre of these scholarly 
investigations (Rieber, 2015; Shearer, 2018). Recent research has underlined how perceived 
Polish subversive and military threats contributed to the early Soviet state’s decision to launch 
hard-line policies such as the industrialisation and collectivisation of agriculture (Davies, 1980; 
Stone, 2000; Samuelson, 2000; Whitewood, 2019; 2020), as well as more ‘soft-line’ measures 
that included the nationalities policy (Pauly, 2015). Moreover, Soviet security anxieties became 
one of the contributing factors in the authorities’ decision to conduct mass arrests targeting the 
Union’s Poles in the early 1930s, as part of the Stalinist terror (on the international factor in 
unleashing the purges, see: Naimark, 2010; Kuromiya, 2011; Khlevniuk, 1995).  
Diplomatic history offers another perspective on the evolution of Polish-Soviet relations during 
this period (Ken, 1996; Kamiński and Zacharias, 1998; Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 2014; 
Materski, 2005; 2019; Bruski, 2010; Kantor and Wołos, 2011; Kornat, 2012a, 2012b). In this 
regard, scholars often focus their attention on the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921 and its 
ramifications for Polish-Soviet and Polish-Ukrainian relations (Ol’shanskii, 1974; Hisem, 
2008; Het’manchuk, 2008; Pisuliński, 2004; Borzęcki, 2008; Dębski, 2013). 
Instead, this article will explore Polish-Soviet and Ukrainian relations through the prism of 
minority experiences, thus contributing to existing scholarship on the respective governments’ 
views on minorities, migration and diasporas abroad. While most scholarly enquiries 





ethnic intolerance and resulted in ethnic-based violence across the region (especially in 
Volhynia: Piotrowski, 2000; Filar, 2003; Motyka, 2006; McBride, 2016; and Eastern Galicia: 
Motyl, 1985; Snyder, 1999; 2003), this article takes a step back to investigate what motivated 
those governments to promote such forms of identification in the first place; and how they 
utilised the national factor of mass mobilisation to achieve their far-reaching strategic goals 
(on Poland’s migration policies, see: Wrzesiński, 1975, 1979; Lusinski, 1998; Kołodziej, 1999; 
Patek, 2000; Kraszewski, 2001. On the Soviet minorities policies towards Poles, see: Iwanow, 
1991; Stroński, 1992; Kupczak, 1994; Brown, 2004). 
The article’s focus on the information campaign, and public discussion surrounding the election 
process to the 1929 Congress of Poles abroad, equally contributes to the debates on mass 
political culture in the interwar Soviet Union. Recent studies on popular participation and 
political culture during the Union’s formative decades has emphasised the bilateral nature of 
the discussion (Getty, 1991; Siegelbaum and Sokolov, 2000; Lomb, 2018; Velikanova, 2018). 
The Soviet state took a deep interest in what people were saying. Within this process, Soviet 
citizens were not without agency and were able to negotiate with the state. While the available 
sources on public opinion among Soviet Poles can hardly prove the participatory and 
collaborative aspect of their relations with the state, the elections provided them with a forum 
through which to voice their disagreement with state policies and criticise state-sponsored 
modernisation. Moreover, the discussion of public opinion among the Soviet Polish population 
provides another angle to understanding the onset of the mass repression of ethnic minorities 
in the early 1930s (on ‘The Polish Operation’ of the 1930s, see: Rubl’ov, Repryntsev, 1995; 
Stroński, 1998; Kokin, Podkur, and Rubl’ov, 2011; Iwanow, 2014). At the height of the ‘war 
scare’, positive attitudes towards Poland and its government, and dissatisfaction with Soviet 
power, expressed and recorded during this public debate reinforced the party’s security 
anxieties to the point that it contributed to the repression of the population based on their ethnic 
identification. 
In this article, the 1929 Congress of Poles abroad is scrutinised on two different levels. At the 
macro level, it examines the Polish political and ideological context behind conceiving and 
organising the first general meeting of Polish minority representatives, set against Soviet 
responses to the Congress, through the intra-party debates and Soviet propaganda. On the micro 
level, the article goes beyond propaganda to explore public opinion among Soviet Poles 
regarding the Congress and Soviet power more generally. This two-level analysis also defines 





campaign surrounding the Congress, it seeks to elucidate a complex interplay between the 
foreign policy considerations, security concerns and minority policies of the Soviet and Polish 
governments. Second, it seeks to use party communications, intelligence and secret reports 
compiled during the local elections and conferences as a means of gauging Soviet Polish public 
opinion towards the regime in the early years of Stalin’s First Five-Year plan. 
This article argues that there was a reverse causality between Soviet-Polish relations: Soviet 
and Polish domestic policies and the Polish minority’s public response. While the context of 
the Polish-Soviet rivalry informed the implementation of Soviet and Polish domestic policies, 
especially those targeting these countries’ minorities and diaspora during the early 1920s, the 
latter had equal impact on public responses, shaping popular opinion towards Soviet power 
among the Polish population. As this paper intends to demonstrate, despite the party’s 
considerable efforts to mobilise and modernise its minorities in the hope of drawing them closer 
to the state, many Poles in Soviet Ukraine, even at the end of the 1920s, expressed a persistent 
nonconformity with Soviet policies. Moreover, they continued to express fear of, and a lack of 
faith in the Soviet government. These negative attitudes towards the Soviet authorities among 
the Polish minority redefined Soviet domestic policy, paving the way for their eventual 
persecution. Consequently, this shift towards ethnic-based terror reinforced the inter-state 
rivalry between Moscow and Warsaw, resulting in greater distrust and antagonism. 
 
‘Class solidarity’ vs. ‘national unity’: the origins of the Congress and the Soviet response  
The initial idea to summon a congress of Poles from abroad emerged among activists affiliated 
to the Union for the Defence of the Western Borderlands (Związek Obrony Kresów 
Zachodnich, ZOKZ) in 1925. ZOKZ was looking for an institutional setting that would promote 
a link between all Poles living abroad and the Polish state without undermining their loyalty to 
their countries of residence (Wrzesiński, 1975, 298). In this, ZOKZ was inspired by a similar 
endeavour undertaken by its German counterpart, the ‘Congress of Germans abroad’ that took 
place in Berlin in the summer of 1925. The Polish authorities were also in favour of the idea, 
having grown increasingly alarmed by the pollical influence Weimar Germany was gaining in 
Europe through playing the minority card. Initiated by German minority organisations in the 
Baltic states, the First Congress of European Nationalities held in Geneva in October 1925, ran 
parallel to the League of Nations, and was instrumentalised by Germans as anti-Versailles 





The Polish delegates to the Congress in Geneva discussed the possibility of holding a similar 
meeting of Polish minority representatives. Shortly thereafter, the leaders of three Polish civic 
associations, ZOKZ, the Polish Emigration Society (Polskie Towarzystwo Emigracyjne) and 
the Adam Mickiewicz Society for the Cultural Support for Poles Abroad (Towarzystwo Opieki 
Kulturalnej nad Polakami Zamieszkałymi Zagranicą im. Adama Mickiewicza), formed an 
organising committee to oversee the future Congress of Poles abroad. The committee also 
included representatives of the Polish government, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MSZ), the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education (MWRiOP) and the Emigration 
office of the Ministry of Labour and Social Care (MPiOS) (Albin, 1981). 
The Congress was initially scheduled for 3 May 1927. An appeal to ‘All Poles beyond Poland’s 
borders’ was circulated worldwide, inviting Poles to take part in the up-coming event. The 
appeal highlighted the cultural and historic unity of the Polish people, disregarding their 
country of residence, as well as the diaspora’s historical responsibilities to the Polish nation 
and state. The declared objective of the Congress was to establish a permanent cultural 
connection between Poles living abroad and their homeland (kraj ojczysty) (TsDAHO, F.1, 
op.20, spr.2935, ark.45-46). The invitation to the Congress was accompanied with a 
preliminary programme along with an explanation as to how quotas for each country would be 
calculated. 
The number of delegates to the Congress was established on the basis of the estimated Polish 
population residing in different countries, with the largest delegations coming from the United 
States (32 delegates representing some three million of American Poles), Germany (24 
delegates) and the Soviet Union (14 delegates representing the Poles of Soviet Ukraine, Belarus 
and Russia). Delegates were to be elected through independent associations of Poles (związek 
polaków) domicile in each country, the formation of which was based on free national and 
cultural self-identification, or for lack thereof, facilitated by the most relevant cultural and 
educational organisations. Altogether, 120 delegates were expected to arrive in Warsaw from 
23 countries, including the Free City Gdansk (TsDAHO, F. 1, op 20, spr.2246, ark.66-67). 
At this point, one could also ask why the organising committee even considered inviting Soviet 
delegates to Warsaw, allowing for potential disruption at the Congress. Mikołaj Iwanow 
suggests that, while the organisers could not simply ignore the large number of Poles residing 
within the Soviet Union’s borders, the invitation was itself an attempt to provoke the 
Communist Party into rejecting their participation and thus provide evidence of the Soviet 





the Soviet delegation (14 in total) was intentionally limited to provoke anger from among 
Polish communists across the border. Moreover, the historian further highlights that it was 
perhaps the first time in Poland’s history that the number of Poles beyond its eastern border 
had been intentionally underestimated: while calculating the quotas for national delegations, 
the Polish population in Soviet Ukraine was estimated to be 300,000, with a further 200,000 in 
Belarus and 150,000 in Russia (Iwanow, 1991, 260). By contrast, the Soviet census of 1926 
recorded more than 780,000 Poles living across the Soviet Union (Vsesoiuznaia Perepis’, 1928, 
XXIV-XXVII; on the problem of the Soviet census see: Palko forthcoming). 
In early December 1926, the editorial boards of the Polish-language Soviet newspapers, 
Trybuna Radziecka in Moscow, Głos Młodzieży in Kyiv and Orka in Minsk, were contacted 
by the Warsaw-based organising committee about the upcoming Congress (TsDAHO, F.1, 
op.20, spr.2246, ark.62-67). In early 1927, the same invitation was also sent to the Ukraine’s 
largest Polish-language newspaper Sierp (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr. 2939, ark. 136-37; Sierp, 
June 4, 1929). The organisers encouraged the editors to publish the committee’s appeal along 
with a dedicated article that would explain the significance of the event. The organisers also 
solicited exhibits for an expedition on the international Polish-language press that was intended 
to be held during the Congress (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2246, ark.62). 
Information about the Congress was immediately passed on to the Communist Party of 
Bolsheviks of Ukraine (KP(b)U) Central Committee (TsK), that promptly called a session to 
discuss the possibility of participating in the Warsaw Congress. As the organisers in Warsaw 
had anticipated, the TsK meeting, held on 11 March 1927, decided that participation by Polish 
delegates from Soviet Ukraine was unadvisable (netselesoobrazno). Instead, a motion was put 
forward to organise an alternative congress of Poles in Soviet Ukraine, where the achievements 
of the Polish minority in the Soviet Union would be set against the failures of Polish 
government’s own minority politics. However, this resolution on non-participation had to be 
confirmed by the TsK of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKP(b) (TsDAHO, 
F.1, op.12, spr.8, ark.79). 
Around that time, information concerning the Congress had also reached the Polish Bureau 
(Pol’biuro), a special unit within the Department for Agitation, Propaganda and Press (APPO, 
Agitprop1) of the TsK VKP(b), responsible for Poles living in Soviet territory. At a special 
session summoned to discuss the invitation to the Congress, a top-secret memorandum, to be 
sent to the TsK VKP(b), was prepared, outlining the Pol’biuro’s position on the matter 





Sofia Dzerzhinskaia,2 the Congress was condemned as an attempt by the Polish government to 
create “a nationalist and Catholic union of Poles outside Poland” that would be used “against 
the Revolution, the Komintern and, primarily, against the Soviet Union” (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 
20, spr. 2495, ark. 38). The future Congress of Poles abroad was itself perceived as an 
instrument of Warsaw that was designed to influence public opinion in support of any future 
military campaigns. Poles living en mass in the Soviet-Polish borderlands were regarded as its 
main targets. By cultivating a sense of political allegiance towards the Polish government, the 
Congress, in the eyes of the Moscow-based Pol’biuro, aimed to create informal military 
outposts that would serve in a future Polish invasion of the USSR. 
Nonetheless, the Pol’biuro were convinced that the Congress in Warsaw could not be ignored. 
According to them, participation by a Soviet delegation could equally yield great benefits for 
Moscow’s own strategic goals. First and foremost, it could potentially help the Soviet 
authorities develop the trust of their Polish population while also provided an international 
forum for Soviet propaganda (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2495, ark. 38). Possible domestic 
gains, the memo continued, included tackling widespread anti-Soviet propaganda among 
Soviet Poles, strengthening their class consciousness and deepening their trust in Soviet power 
while encouraging them to contribute to the process of the construction of socialism (TsDAHO, 
F.1, op. 20, spr. 2495, ark. 39). 
Internationally, the Congress might also provide one of very few legal opportunities to agitate 
in favour of the Soviet Union and its ideology abroad. Soviet participation could have important 
political and international resonance too—during the Congress, the Soviet delegation hoped to 
draw international attention to the negative treatment of national minorities in Poland and reject 
any potential support to Poland’s military plans. This might also have the added bonus of 
helping the Soviets gain the sympathy of Poland’s workers and peasants as well as improving 
the Union’s image abroad. Instead, rejecting participation could also be construed as evidence 
of the Soviet Union’s oppression of its Polish minority, leading to even stronger anti-Soviet 
attitudes, domestically as well as internationally.  
Given the above, it was decided that the Soviet delegation would go to Warsaw to emphasise 
that their loyalty to the socialist cause was stronger than their connection to Poland. At the 
Congress they would reject the Congress slogan of ‘national unity’ in favour of Soviet slogan 
of ‘class solidarity’ (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2495, ark. 39). In a way, it was a win-win 
situation for Soviet ideologists: either they would use the Congress as a forum to promote 





nature of the Polish ‘fascist’ regime, thus validating and reinforcing their anti-Polish 
propaganda narrative.  
Consequently, Soviet delegation’s participation at the Congress of Poles abroad was deemed 
both important and necessary. To gain most from its campaign, the Pol’biuro encouraged a 
broad public discussion of the Congress’ aims and objectives at all levels. The election of the 
Congress delegates would receive widespread coverage in the local, republican and central 
press, both in Polish and other languages (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2495, ark. 40). On 7 April 
1927, the Pol’biuro recommendations were approved by the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). 
Contrary to the TsK KP(b)U’s decision, the VKP(b) described Soviet participation at the 
Warsaw Congress as being ‘advisable’ (tselesoobraznyi). Responsibility for organising the 
campaign and form the delegation itself was thus assigned to the Secretariat of the TsK VKP(b) 
(Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 466-67). 
 
The political dimension of the Congress of Poles abroad  
Meanwhile, following the coup d’état of May 1926, Marshal Józef Piłsudski had overthrown 
the democratically elected government of President Stanisław Wojciechowski and Prime 
Minister Wincenty Witos and installed his own political movement of Sanation (Sanacja). As 
preparations for the Congress continued, so did the public debate around its ostensive 
objectives. Such debates exposed the lack of uniformity among the various communities of the 
Polish diaspora itself, especially in their assessment of the coup. Anti-Sanacja voices were 
particularly strong among representatives in the United States, France and Germany, those 
countries whose delegations to the Congress would also be the largest by a considerable 
margin. Moreover, Piłsudski’s supporters were still a minority within the MSZ, hence they 
could not rely on the Ministry’s compliance in organising the Congress (Wrzesiński, 1975, 
300). In addition, the Congress’s proposed date of 3 May 1927 coincided with an election 
campaign in Poland, sparking fears that the Congress could be used as a forum for anti-
government opposition during a politically sensitive time. The government therefore intended 
to postpone the Congress’s convocation for as long as it needed to gain enough influence and 
support to define the event’s ideological makeup and decisions (Wrzesiński, 1975, 299). 
However, it was the lack of unanimity among the Polish communities abroad during the 






Nevertheless, Polish civic and cultural organisations did not abandon the idea of the Congress. 
Following a broad public discussion of the importance of such a gathering, as well as the 
consolidation of the Sanacja regime as the dominant force in Polish politics, a new date was 
set for 14 July 1929. Unlike in 1927, the new organising committee fully reflected the dominant 
role of the state and Polish Catholic Church in defining the shape and course of the Congress. 
This new organising committee itself was established under the patronage of the President 
Ignacy Mościcki, Marszałek Piłsudski and Cardinal August Hlond. In addition, the committee 
consisted of numerous government representatives, including those from the ministries of 
foreign and internal affairs, religious affairs and education and labour and social care, as well 
as the mayors of Poland’s largest cities: Warsaw, Cracow and Poznan (Pamiętnik, 1930, 20). 
The 1929 Congress appeal was somewhat different to the one distributed two years prior. In 
1927, the organisers had wished to reassure Poles living abroad that their home country had 
not forgotten its ‘children’ dispersed throughout the world and that it still remained responsible 
for them. By contrast, the 1929 petition highlighted the duty of the Poles abroad to contribute 
towards strengthening the Polish state. While the 1927 Congress was meant to emphasise the 
responsibilities of the state towards Poles worldwide (such as identifying their cultural needs 
or supporting education activities), the 1929 Congress accentuated the Polish diaspora’s 
patriotic obligations in supporting the new state. The Congress was meant to show Poles abroad 
“how to be the spokesmen of the Republic of Poland and defenders of its interests in the most 
advantageous way for yourself and Poland” (quoted from Albin, 1981, 73). 
This new emphasis reflected a more general shift in the government’s emigration policy and 
their attitudes towards Polonia. The ideological scope of the Congress as conceived before 
1926 had reflected the national doctrine of the National Democracy movement (Endecja), 
according to which the Polish state was seen as stemming from the Polish people and was hence 
obliged to extend its support also to those Poles residing beyond its borders (Wrzesiński, 1975, 
297). The Sanacja regime was instead seeking to subordinate the interests of emigrant 
communities to those of the state, with the latter caring “for the economic and spiritual benefit 
of the immigrants while adjusting those to the benefit of the state”, as stated in a memo from 
the MSZ (quoted from Wrzesiński, 1975, 300). Particular emphasis was placed on using Polish 
diaspora communities as conduits for improving Poland’s international position 
(Lencznarowicz, 2019, 191). To achieve this, however, a centralised organisation of Poles 
residing abroad was needed with the Congress deemed a good opportunity to discuss what such 





Congress, the First Congress of Poles abroad saw the idea of “uniting all our compatriots in 
exile into one organised entity for the benefit of the Polish state” made manifest (Pamiętnik, 
1930, 50). 
In mid-April 1929, the official Polish press announced that the Congress of Poles abroad would 
take place on 14 July 1929, and that invitations were to finally be sent out. Unlike in 1927, 
however, no official invitation was received by the Soviet Union (Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 
468). The Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did not show much interest in the event, 
unlike Agitprop and the Pol’buro, although they had received this information quite late and 
almost ‘by chance’ (Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 468). Towards the end of April, the Secretariat 
of the TsK VKP(b) decided to establish a commission headed by the Agitprop chief, 
Aleksander Krinitski. It is important to note, however, that there was no unified view on the 
Soviet participation at the Congress. Krinitski regarded the event as a great opportunity for 
anti-Polish propaganda both internally and internationally. Conversely, the leader of the Polish 
Communist Party (PPK) in Moscow, Leon Purman, and the head of the Special Department of 
the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU), Ian Olski (Kulakovski), opposed the idea either 
for ideological or security concerns. 
Krinitski himself was well-aware of the fact that the Polish Congress was ideologically hostile 
to the Soviet state. In a note addressed to the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b), dated from 29 May 
1929, he recognised that the Congress had been summoned by the ‘fascists’ government and 
would make voicing opposition to the Piłsudskiites virtually impossible, unlike in 1927. 
Nevertheless, he believed that Soviet participation in the Congress was still ‘advisable’ 
(tselesoobraznyi) and could allow Moscow to pursue several objectives. First, the forum itself 
could be used to uncover the fascist nature of the Polish government. Second, the Soviet 
delegation could refute “the rumours of persecutions on national grounds” in the Soviet Union. 
Third, sanctioning the participation of Soviet Poles would undermine those Poles in the Soviet 
Union who “have not yet rejected the nationalist ideology and remain under the influence of 
the priests (księża)”. Finally, a state-sanctioned presence would prevent the participation of a 
delegation “hostile to us”. Instead, the Agitprop head proposed to elect the delegates under the 
close supervision of both the central and republican TsKs in such a way that 60 per cent would 
be the members of the Communist Party (Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 468). 
In addition to Krinitski’s considerations, the decision to endorse the Soviet delegation’s 
participation was linked to the changing international political scene. It was believed that the 





5 June 1929, would lead to less Western support for Poland, granting the Soviet Union an upper 
hand in its ongoing rivalry. Consequently, the TsK VKP(b) granted its approval for Soviet 
participation. On 6 June 1929, a special TsK commission was established to supervise the 
election of delegates to the Warsaw Congress. Although headed by Krinitskii, as a compromise, 
Olski was also included as a the OGPU’s representative (Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 468). 
 
‘Manifestation of Polish fascism’: the information campaign 
Once the official position towards the Congress had been defined, the Soviet information 
campaign commenced. Already on 3 June 1929, Trybuna Radziecka featured an editorial 
entitled ‘The Manifestation of Polish fascism’ (Manifestacja faszysmu polskiego). The same 
article appeared on the pages of the republican Polish press, Ukrainian Sierp being among 
them. The editorial’s aims were two-fold. First, it provided an outlet for Soviet anti-Polish 
propaganda. The article went on to expose the ‘true’ intentions of the Polish ‘fascist’ regime 
that had invited Poles from abroad to the Congress to break the unity of the world revolutionary 
movement, establish fascist footholds worldwide and rally support for its government’s anti-
Soviet military campaign (Sierp, June 6, 1929; TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2931, ark 9-14). 
Second, it sought to mobilise Poles across the Soviet Union, especially workers and poor and 
middle-class peasants, to take active part in the election of delegates to the Congress and, once 
in Warsaw, to voice their disapproval to the Poland’s anti-Soviet agenda. The editorial 
illustrated this strategy: 
Our delegates will go to Warsaw to tell the whole truth about the Soviet 
Union. They will speak about the ongoing grand socialist construction here, 
the socialist building that is firmly based on the conscious active participation 
of the broadest masses of workers and toiling peasants, including those of 
Polish origin, who had fought and won in October alongside other workers 
and peasants, and are now building a new life (Sierp, June 6, 1929; TsDAHO, 
F.1, op. 20, spr. 2931, ark.12). 
To challenge the Congress’s intentions, the authors declared that Poles living in Ukraine, 
Belarus and Russia had only one ‘socialist motherland’ and they were ready to defend it from 
‘international and Polish imperialists’ (Sierp, June 6, 1929; TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2931, 
ark.12). Soviet Poles would go to Warsaw to reject the slogan of ‘national unity’ and instead 





published at the end of the article concluded with the following proclamations : “Long Live 
the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, the motherland of all toilers”; “Long Live the 
Union of Soviet republics—the only motherland of the working masses of the whole world”; 
“Long live a future proletarian Poland that would stride hand-in-hand with the Soviet 
proletariat”; and “Long live Komintern—the headquarters of the world revolution and its 
section—the Polish Communist Party” (Sierp, June 6, 1929; TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, 
ark. 17-18). 
From 6 June onward, all the major newspapers in the Soviet Union, including the central state 
and party organ Pravda, had daily features dedicated to the elections of Congress delegates in 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. This coverage condemned Poland and its national policy, lauded 
Lenin’s nationality strategy and the Soviet minority regime, acknowledged the social and 
economic development of the Polish minority in the border republics and highlighted the 
leading role of the party as a purveyor of modernity among its Polish communities. Newspapers 
also published dedicated features on party activists, privileged rural workers, teachers and 
medics of Polish origin who condemned the intentions of the Warsaw Congress and highlighted 
their loyalty to the Soviet regime (e.g., Pravda, July 2, 1929). Needless to say, such voices 
represented the strata of Polish population that had benefited the most from Soviet power and 
its preferential minority regime. 
The coverage produced by the central authorities did more than spread information, however. 
By outlining a list of concise themes, they focused popular debate and provided discussion 
materials for bottom-level election conferences. They also offered rhetorical tools on how to 
speak about the Warsaw Congress and communicate with the party. Most importantly, the 
Soviet press encouraged Poles to participate in the wider public discourse and express opinions 
for or against the party line. Meanwhile, party officials meticulously recorded their answers 
and opinions. 
 
‘The Soviet Union is our only Motherland’: the election campaign  
With the approval of the central party leadership, the republican Pol’biuro launched the 
election campaign. On 17 June 1929, an all-Ukrainian Public Committee was established 
tasked with organising and supervising the election of delegates to the all-Ukrainian Congress, 
scheduled for 2 July 1929. The Committee’s presidium consisted of the director of the Kharkiv 





Kharkiv Sierp i Molot factory, Shved; a worker at the Kharkiv Profintern factory, 
Smarchevsky; and the editor of the Polish Section of the Central Publishing House for the 
People of the Soviet Union, Sovinsky. The latter was appointed as the head of the Committee, 
later replaced by Buivan (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2939, ark. 145;147-148). 
Altogether, 150 delegates were to be elected to the congress in Kyiv during the first election 
stage. This calculation was based on the number of Poles residing in each province, with the 
largest delegations representing Volhynia, Kyiv, Shepetivka, Korosten and Kam’ianets okruhy 
(TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2941, ark.28). Elections were organised at the provincial (okruh) 
(Volhynia, Shepetivka, Korosten, Berdychiv, Kyiv, Proskuriv, Kam’ianets, Vinnytsia); 
regional (raion) (Mohyliv, Uman, Kherson, Melitopol) and city (Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, 
Kam’ianske) levels. In every okruh, a separate public committee was formed to supervise local 
elections and collect donations towards funding the travel expenses of the Ukrainian delegation 
to Warsaw. 
The regulations received from the Warsaw organising committee stipulated that each delegate 
sent to the Congress should be elected through an independent association of Poles. In the 
Soviet context, however, these elections had great political importance and could not be simply 
entrusted to non-party organisations, let alone that there were actually none. Instead, control 
over the election process was in hands of the TsK KP(b)U. This body instructed that “in order 
to ensure appropriate political supervision of the election campaign, each election commission 
should consist of three members: a member of the party committee, a secretary of the Pol’biuro 
and a head of the OGPU” (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2932, ark.26). Detailed instructions on 
how to prepare, guide and shape public debates, gauge popular reactions among Poles towards 
Soviet power and, last but not least, how to select the ‘appropriate’ delegates were designed 
centrally and handed down to local organisers. As part of the process, party and state officials 
encouraged deliberation of Polish and Soviet politics among candidates. Overall, the election 
campaign was an opportunity to explore whether the Polish population, well-known for its 
hostile attitude towards the central authorities, had accepted the Soviet regime and whether 
party efforts to sovietise its minorities had been successful. 
It is worth noting that delegates to the Congress were elected under the Soviet constitution and 
Soviet electoral law, according to which certain Poles were disfranchised. According to the 
data on the 1925/26 elections to village soviets, for instance, 0.7 per cent of Ukraine’s Poles 
were denied the right to vote based on their social status. During the 1926/27 elections, the 





spr. 2496, ark. 47) while in 1929 the number of Poles deprived of voting rights had grown to 
3.8 per cent (TsDAVO, F.413, op.1, spr.452, ark.154). By applying this law, the party could 
ensure that the delegates to the Warsaw Congress would be elected by and among those deemed 
most trustworthy: workers and poor and middle peasants, thus minimising the influence of 
wealthier peasants (kulaks) and Catholic priests (księża) over the election process. 
During the three-week election campaign, 37 raion conferences with a total of 1,100 
participants were organised; in addition, a total of 1,219 participants attended 17 okruh and city 
conferences. At each meeting, a protocol reporting on the process of electing candidates was 
prepared. Such protocols followed a prescribed script throughout, although some were written 
in Polish and others in Ukrainian. These local meetings had a similar agenda: providing an 
overview of the international situation, introducing the aims of the First Five-Year plan, 
discussing the goals of the Warsaw Congress of Poles abroad, electing delegates, suggesting 
messages for the elected delegates to pass on to the Congress and gathering voluntary 
donations. At each conference, the ideology of ‘fascist Poland’ was rejected, while the party’s 
leading role was recognised. For example, the protocol of the committee meeting in Uman 
from 19 June 1929 read as follows:  
We do not recognise fascist Poland where toiling masses and national 
minorities are being oppressed. The Soviet Union is our only motherland. 
Here, all power belongs to the working masses, and all national minorities, 
including Poles, enjoy equal rights. We wish that the proletariat in Poland 
achieve the same rights as we already enjoy here in the Soviet Union 
(TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, ark. 16).  
The protocol from the committee meeting in Hrudka from 16 June 1929 followed a similar 
line:  
We would like to contrast the slogans from fascist Poland with those of 
fraternity among the proletariat from all countries and the poor and middle 
peasants regardless of nationality in their common fight against capitalism 
around the world (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, ark. 45). 
Local organising committees were also expected to solicit private donations to fund the Soviet 
delegation’s participation at the Warsaw Congress. Indeed, during the election campaign more 
than 10,000 rubles were donated overall (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2940, ark. 49-50). The 





(TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2942). Very few attendees were eager to donate, however. As seen 
from the reports, prepared by the party officials sent to supervise the election process, local 
conference participants were reluctant to sign subscription lists or even have their name 
mentioned in the meeting report, fearing that their signatures might later be used against them. 
In Korosten, for instance, one party representative attempted to explain the low number of 
signatories by referring to an incident during the civil war, when those who had signed a 
petition against Soviet power were promptly executed (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2932, ark.2). 
Others feared that in case of war with Poland, their signatures would be deemed as proof of 
collaboration with the Soviet state. 
Secret reports compiled during the election campaign also suggest that the Polish population 
was anticipating another war. In the village of Petrovka in Nyzhniosirohozky raion, for 
example, delegates to the local conference warned that “War is imminent. Poles will come and 
execute those who have signed” (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, ark.6) or that “There is no 
need to sign the protocol. Anyway, Soviet power is doomed, the war with Poland has started 
already, and those who sign will be in trouble” (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, ark.6). 
Conversely, participants used the rhetorical and political tools provided by these new public 
forums to influence the outcome of the election and negotiate with officials. In Korosten, north-
west of Kyiv, one Pole had even pledged 15 rubles from each household in exchange for ‘their 
own’ candidates to be elected to the Congress (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2932, ark.2). While 
these reports were used to justify the lack of social activism among Ukraine’s Poles, they also 
exposed the discrepancy between the specific vision the party had for the campaign and its 
reception at the local level. 
 
‘Let Poland take over Ukraine faster’: public opinion towards Soviet power 
Newspaper articles written by the authorities created an image of all-out support for the Soviet 
state and its minority policies. However, secret reports detailing the course of these local 
discussions exposed a wide array of opinions that belied the propaganda slogans. Top-secret 
letters of explanation (dopovidna zapyska) sent by the okruh party committees to the TsK 
KP(b)U often reported on low attendance at conference meetings and a general lack of public 
interest in the elections. Limited social activism reflected the low level of political and civic 
education among the Polish minority while also suggesting poor preparatory work on the 





border provinces, the Soviet state was underrepresented, often having no party cells or party 
organisers at the local level. Those party activists who did work in these villages were accused 
of failing to reach out to a broader audience and not making party propaganda known to those 
communities without access to a Polish-language press. Weak party organisation at the local 
level resulted in granting the ‘broadest democracy’ to the masses (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, 
spr.2931, ark.5). Consequently, kulaks, priests and members of the Catholic church committees 
entered regional organising committees and were elected as delegates to the okruh and 
republican conferences (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2932, ark. 15). 
The campaign involved collecting and accumulating popular comments. These opinions often 
contradicted the goals of the central leadership. One party investigator, who had been sent to 
perform agitational work and supervise the elections, observed a certain indifference towards 
public matters. Sceptics even questioned the fairness of the elections with one concluding that 
“They will choose their own candidates and will not listen to us” (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, 
spr.2932, ark.12); others doubted that their concerns would be taken seriously: “Why should 
we bother, no one will believe us anyway” (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, ark.4). The focus 
and concern of central officials, however, was about the loyalties of the Soviet Polish 
population. Public opinion, the reports suggested, was often in support of Poland.  
As seen from the popular comments, political propaganda often resulted in the opposite of the 
intended effect. Extensive press coverage aimed to stir up fears of Polish subversiveness, 
instead kindled hope of swift political change among the Polish minority. Poles in the western 
provinces, whose livelihood was repeatedly threatened by adverse weather conditions and little 
assistance from the state, hoped for a better life under the Polish government. Comments 
ranged from those encouraging the election of pro-Polish sympathisers as delegates to the 
Warsaw Congress (“We need to choose good delegates, who will tell how we live here in the 
free Russia” [TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2931, ark.5]) to open calls for a military invasion (“Let 
Poland take over Ukraine faster, then we will have more potatoes” [TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, 
spr.2931, ark.4]; “Maybe Poland wants to take over Ukraine and this is the reason for calling 
the Congress? If Poland takes over Ukraine, life for us will become easier” [TsDAHO, F.1, op. 
20, spr.2931, ark.4]). 
Pro-Polish sympathies, the reporters summarised, depended on the social origin of the 
participants. In the region of Markhlevsk, according to the report, “all working-class Poles were 
against the counter-revolutionary plans of the Warsaw Congress”. Similarly, poor peasants and 





Richer peasants, instead, welcomed the Polish move, as presented by the comments from the 
village of Nikolaievka, Velykolepetyskiy raion: “I wish our own delegates went [to the 
Congress] and told them everything. Perhaps life here would become easier for us” (F.1, op.2, 
spr.2931, ark.5). 
The reports also commented on the negative influence of local priests who were actively 
involved in the campaign. In some instances, priests urged their parishes to boycott the 
elections and other party initiatives linked to the Congress. In others, they encouraged people 
to exploit the elections for their own benefit. In one reported instance, a ksiądz in Novohrad-
Volynsky had emphasised that “mother Poland is calling her children to shelter under her 
wings, she has not forgotten us”, and encouraged his parishioners to take active part in the 
elections (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2932, ark.11). In Kytaihorod in Korosten region a local 
ksiądz, a certain Bredytsky encouraged others to vote for ‘our own’ candidates who would tell 
‘the truth’ about the Soviet Union. If this was not possible, he suggested writing letters to the 
organising committee in Warsaw, informing them about the conditions facing Poles in Ukraine 
and initiated a fund-raising campaign in support of such initiatives (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, 
spr.2932, ark.8-8zv.). 
Top-secret reports highlighted how participants had taken advantage of the public discussion, 
and the state’s own language, to bring to their grievances and disagreements with government 
policies. A telling example comes from the Polish Markhlevsk Autonomous district, the first 
and only Polish national region in Soviet Ukraine established in 1925, some 120 km east of the 
Polish border. One S. Marchevsky, head of the Politbiuro of the Volhnnia okruh party 
committee, was appointed to supervise the elections in the okruh. He reported that peasants in 
Volhynia remained very much under the influence of the kurkuls and had little regard for the 
Soviet authorities. In the villages of Velyki Kosyri and Nerash of Pulyn raion, Marchevsky 
noted that, “kurkuli spread rumours that a man came from Warsaw to take all Poles to Poland” 
(TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2932, ark.12). Marchevsky also referred to a complaint by a young 
middle peasant from the village of Hremiache (Korvyn village soviet) as exemplifying the 
attitudes of the Volhynia Poles towards the Soviet state, its policies and strategies of ethnic 
identification. He further observed that the villagers: 
want to live as in old times. Without the cooperative system. [They say that] 
the newspapers lie. They all write about the achievements. And where are 
they? That they were tired of reading about the Five-Year plan, that the 





that they give cheaper to the poor who drink and play cards. If Lenin were a 
good person, no one would have tried to assassinate him in [19]18; that a 
peasant is silent only because he fears the terror. That when he read 
Mickewicz and [Henryk] Sienkiewicz, he felt more like a Pole, than now 
when reading [Felix] Dzerzhinski and [Julian] Marchlevski’ (TsDAHO, F.1, 
op. 20, spr.2932, ark.13). 
The reports also exposed a deep distrust of the party and its activists, who even after a decade 
of Soviet rule where not regarded as, to use Stalin’s expression, ‘near and dear’ to the local 
population. In the village of Nerash, the local residents were taken aback by the presence of a 
party representative, whom they regarded as an outsider: “Look! A representative was sent to 
us; but is he ours? Can you hear how he sings Communist (poet po-kommunisticheskomu)?” 
(TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr.2932, ark.12). Another report showed that people were generally 
opposed to the communists and did not want to take part in any initiatives linked to the party. 
At one local village conference, the participants had even asked the head of Volhynia okruh 
Pol’buiro if he was a communist. Following his responding in the positive, the villagers 
retorted that “he has sold his Catholic religion for money” (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2931, 
ark.13). 
These reports showed that public opinion among Poles at the local level was often contrary to 
that expected by the state with local interpretations of the Warsaw Congress and its aims often 
being in opposition to the official party line. While Soviet newspapers encouraged Poles to 
condemn the Polish Congress and express loyalty towards the Union, many welcomed it as a 
sign that the Polish government had not forgotten the Polish population across the eastern 
border and would come to ease their lot. While the party allowed and even encouraged popular 
participation, hoping to elicit public support, the public debate exposed the weakness of the 
party at the local level. Overall, a wide array of opinions expressed by the local Polish 
population, particularly those suggesting deeply rooted sympathies towards the Second Polish 
Republic and scepticism of Soviet achievements, amplified the pre-existing anxieties of the 
Moscow leadership over the perceived disloyalty of their minorities.  
 
Pursuing ‘destructive tasks and political goals’: the rejection of the Soviet delegation 
On 2 July 1929, 150 delegates from across Soviet Ukraine arrived in Kyiv for the all-Ukrainian 





attend the Congress of Poles abroad in Warsaw. The meeting followed the prescribed script, 
with its programme being pre-approved by the TsK KP(b)U. Delegates acknowledged the 
success of the Soviet regime, especially the industrialisation and collectivisation campaigns, 
and the Moscow’s nationalities and minority policies (Visti VUTsVK, July 5; July 6, 1929; 
Pravda, July 2, July 4, 1929). The conference participants also approved the text of a greeting 
telegram to be sent to the Head of Ukraine’s Executive Committee Hryhori Petrovsky, in which 
the Polish population expressed full support to Soviet power and its policies (Visti VUTsVK, 
July 13, 1929). In addition to this, the delegates were called upon to vote for two open letters 
to their fellows in Poland. The first of these, composed by the Polish Soviet pioneers, was 
addressed to ‘The children of the toiling masses in Poland’, urging their comrades to help their 
parents and older siblings “in their revolutionary struggle against the fascist yoke” (TsDAHO, 
F.1, op. 20, spr.2940, ark. 38, 39). The second letter, ‘To the toilers in Poland’, invited Polish 
workers and peasants to come to Soviet Ukraine where they could witness the advances of 
Soviet minorities first-hand (Visti VUTsVK, July 6, 1929). The respective visit of the Polish 
delegation, composed of representatives of different national minorities residing in Poland, 
took place in August 1929 (Pravda, August 9, 1929; and Rupasov 2000, 470-71; 473-74). Poles 
from Soviet Ukraine also invited their counterparts from Soviet Belarus and Russia in order to 
participate in a socialist competition to rebuild Polish villages, that included a campaign to 
eradicate illiteracy in three years, full collectivisation and increased crop yields (Visti VUTsVK, 
July 5, 1929; Pravda, July 4, 1929). 
 During the all-Ukrainian Conference, five delegates from Ukraine were approved to travel to 
Warsaw. These were: Karolina Khimska, a peasant from Hrechany (Proskuriv okruh); Sierp’s 
editor Konstantin Vyshnevsky; Roman Sheviatovsky, a worker from the First Berdychiv State 
Tannery; Karl Shymansky, the head of the village soviet from Shepetivka okruh; and 
Frantsishek Rakovsky, a worker from the Felix Kon porcelain factory in the Polish Markhlevsk 
region (Visti VUTsVK, 1929, 6 July). They subsequently received international passports and 
were instructed to apply for entry visas into Poland (TsDAHO, F.1, op. 20, spr. 2944; Visti 
VUTsVK, July 13, 1929).  
On 2-3 July, a similar conference took place in Minsk where another five representatives were 
elected from among 114 delegates. On 3-4 July, a Congress of Poles of the RSFSR elected 
another four delegates. These arrived in Kyiv on 12 July 1929, where they formed a joint Soviet 
delegation to participate at the Congress in Warsaw. Two of Russia’s delegates from Moscow, 





secretary, respectively (Pravda, 1929, 11 July). Shortly after this, all fourteen delegates were 
approved by the Politburo TsK VKP(b) (Ken and Rupasov, 2000, 471-72). 
The information campaign surrounding the election of the Soviet delegates was closely 
monitored by the Congress organisers in Warsaw, as well as Polish diplomats in the respective 
Soviet republics. As early as 17 June 1929, the Polish legation in Moscow prepared a report to 
the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed by the Polish envoy Stanisław Patek. The report 
analysed the propaganda campaign surrounding the elections to the Warsaw Congress in the 
Soviet press. According to the communiqué, the party had consistently interfered in the process 
of electing the Soviet delegates (AAN, Ambasada RP w Moskwie, sygn.73, ark.2, ark3; 
Dokumenty i materialy, 1967, 5: 393-397). Moreover, said delegates had been chosen from 
among party activists, who shared the Communist ideology and thus were hostile to the Polish 
Republic. Polish diplomats in Moscow also believed that the Soviet government was intending 
to use the Warsaw Congress as a legal forum to pursue its “destructive tasks and political goals” 
(AAN, Ambasada RP w Moskwie, sygn.73, ark.3). In addition to this, the report continued, 
participation by the Soviet delegation could strengthen local communist and radical left forces. 
This also posed the risk of exacerbating Poland’s own domestic tensions, since the Soviet 
delegation would bring money to fund these groups’ future activities. In summation, the 
participation of the Soviet delegation at the Congress of Poles abroad could be “destructive 
politically, […] even more so, it could lead to general disturbance; and it could even impede 
the entire course of the Congress” (AAN, Ambasada RP w Moskwie, sygn.73, ark.3). The 
Moscow Consulate also suggested that the Organising Committee in Warsaw inform the Soviet 
organisers that the invitations for the Soviet delegates could not be sent. This would provide 
the Consulate with a formal reason to reject its members’ visa applications (AAN, Ambasada 
RP w Moskwie, sygn.73, ark.4). 
The communication from the Polish legation in Moscow was received in Warsaw on 17 June, 
the same day that the all-Ukrainian public committee initiated Soviet Ukraine’s election 
campaign. On 28 June 1929, at the height of the election and propaganda campaigns in the 
Soviet republics, the Congress Organising Committee sent a letter to the All-Russian Public 
Committee in Moscow informing them about the decision to reject the Soviet delegation’s 
participation at the Congress of Poles abroad. The letter was signed by the chairman of the 
Organising Committee, Marszałek of the Senate Professor Julian Szymański and its general 





The letter explained that the decision to reject the Soviet delegation stemmed from the fact that 
the elections had been held in contravention of the Organising Committee’s stipulations. The 
coverage in the Soviet press had proven that the delegates were not elected by the free choice 
of the Polish population or through independent associations of Poles within the country; the 
letter accused the party of control over elections and manipulation. Moreover, many Poles were 
not able to participate in the elections since they were disfranchised under Soviet law. In fact, 
the Consular Section of the Polish Legation in Moscow suggested that only 30 per cent of the 
Polish population could participate in the elections (AAN, F.510, sygn.95, ark.94). The 
Organising Committee therefore believed that the delegates approved to the Congress would 
not represent the Polish population of the Soviet Union. Instead, they would arrive at the 
Congress having been tasked to disrupt its work and publicly reject its approved aims. Given 
these circumstances, the organisers did not consider the participation of the Soviet delegation 
either possible, or necessary (AAN, MSZ, sygn.10294, ark.39-40; Polacy na Ukrainie, 106-
107; TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2931, ark.130). The same letter was received by Ukraine’s 
Organising Committee and the General Consul of the Polish Republic in Kharkiv (TsDAHO, 
F.1, op.20, spr.2935, ark.39, 41-41zv.). 
Warsaw’s decision, nevertheless, initially remained confidential (Życki 2007, 111), and the 
Soviet organisers continued their preparation and information campaign regardless. The fact 
that the Soviet delegation would not be allowed to travel to Poland became widely known only 
after its members had already submitted their visa application to the Consular Section in 
Moscow on 9 July, more than ten days after Warsaw had informed Moscow of its decision. 
This official rejection galvanised the anti-Polish campaign in the Soviet press. Republican 
conferences of Polish delegates were now used as a means of showcasing the social and cultural 
achievements of the Soviet Union and its numerous minorities. They also provided Soviet 
ideologists with an opportunity to slander the Polish ‘fascist’ government that had rejected the 
Soviet delegation “out of fear to hear the truth about Soviet achievements” (TsDAHO, F.1, 
op.20, spr.2940, ark.93). Polish organisers, Soviet officials continued, had disregarded the will 
of 98 per cent of the Soviet Polish population and instead sided with that 2 per cent who had 
not been eligible to vote (TsDAHO, F.1, op.20, spr.2931, ark.81-89; Pravda, July11, 1929). 
The rejection of Soviet delegation’s participation at the Congress in Warsaw was thus further 
proof of the event’s true intention: to mobilise the Polish diaspora for a future war with the 
Soviet Union (Visti VUTsVK, July 13, 1929; Pravda, July 11, 1929; Komunist, July 5, 1929; 





In addition, mass rallies took place on industrial sites and at state institutions across Soviet 
Ukraine were Polish workers expressed their outrage over Warsaw’s decision. Meanwhile in 
Minsk, some 15,000 people marched through the streets towards the Polish consulate, where a 
note of protest was presented to the consul himself. Another rally in support of the Soviet 
delegates took place in Leningrad on 17 July (Iwanow 1991, 265). 
The Communist Party also used their proxies in Poland to broadcast their protest to audiences 
across the border. At the beginning of July, ‘The Committee demanding the acceptance of the 
Polish workers’ and a peasants’ delegation from the Soviet Union to the Congress of Poles 
abroad’ was formed in the Polish Sejm. The committee was composed of PPK members and 
other Soviet sympathisers. It issued an appeal to the Polish Sejm objecting to the Organisation 
committee of the Warsaw Congress’s decision, on the grounds that it was motivated, according 
to the text, by the desire of the Polish government to hide the truth about the achievements of 
the Soviet Poles, all while the toiling masses in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well 
as Lithuanians and Jews, continue to be oppressed by Polish fascists. The appeal was signed 
by the leader of the Communist faction in Sejm; Konstanty Sypuła; the representative from the 
Ukrainian Peasants’ and Workers’ Socialist Union Sel-Rob, Kyryło Walnyćkyj; and a 
representative of the Belarusian Workers’ and Peasants’ Union, or Hramada, Ihnat Dwarczanin 
(Visti VUTsVK, July 11, 1929). 
 
‘The Miserable Bankruptcy of Polish fascism’ – propaganda continues 
The First Congress of Poles abroad commenced on 14 July 1929 with a celebratory Mass in 
the Holy Cross Church in Warsaw and a march to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. 
Afterwards, Marszałek of the Senate Szymański officially opened the Congress at the Sejm 
building. Overall, 98 delegates from eighteen countries and the Free City of Gdansk 
participated. Some seats remained unoccupied – a symbolic reminder of the Polish population 
in Lithuania and the Soviet Union that, albeit for different reasons, were not represented at the 
Congress (Pamiętnik, 1930, 44). The absence of delegates from Lithuania and the Soviet Union 
was used as an occasion for propaganda speeches, in which the speakers spared no effort in 
seeking to attack the respective governments for not allowing their Polish populations to freely 
exercise their cultural rights and join the Congress at Warsaw of their own free will. 
In his opening address, Szymański linked the rejection of exit visas for Lithuania’s Poles to 





representing a Polish population that had resided there for centuries could pose a threat to the 
entire country. Conversely, he continued, it had been the Congress’s decision not to allow the 
Soviet representatives to attend. The organisers could not permit the event to be used as a forum 
for spreading Bolshevik slogans. Moreover, their participation in this ‘family gathering’ was 
not welcomed since, as the available sources had suggested, Soviet Poles did not view 
themselves as part of Poland, instead acknowledging the Soviet Union as their true motherland 
(Pamiętnik, 1930, 46). 
In his closing remarks, Lernatowicz, on behalf of the Organising Committee, maintained that 
Poles in the Soviet Union were not able to act independently and freely develop their cultural 
rights (Pamiętnik, 1930, 87). A special resolution on the absence of the delegations from the 
Soviet Union, in which Moscow was condemned for its repressive policies and disregard of 
minority rights, was also voted upon:  
To our compatriots, who for many years have been subjected to the barbaric 
persecutions in the prisons of the Solovetsky Islands and Siberia for defending their 
nationality, language and the faith of their fathers, who have been deprived of all 
the rights and opportunities to freely develop their culture, this Congress sends the 
deepest expressions of sympathy and wishes to reassure them that Poles from all 
over the world, as represented at this Congress, will never forget the plight of their 
brethren beyond the eastern border, hoping that nothing could rip from their hearts 
the most sacred sense of Polishness (Pamiętnik, 1930, 116). 
At the same, the Soviet anti-Polish propaganda campaign continued apace. As the Pol’biuro’s 
leaders had predicted back in 1927, the rejection of the Soviet delegation became a running 
feature, enabling the party to accelerate its anti-Polish campaign, albeit mainly for internal use. 
On the Congress’s opening day, Soviet newspapers vehemently criticised its aims, as well as 
the Polish government more broadly. Since the Soviet delegation was not allowed to travel to 
Warsaw, the main content of its intended presentation appeared in the press. On 14 July, a long 
front-page editorial, entitled ‘The Miserable Bankruptcy of Polish Fascism’, appeared in 
Pravda. The article glossed over negative political developments in Poland since 1926 coup, 
while pointing out the deepening social and economic crisis in the country (Pravda, July 14, 
1929). Instead, it detailed far-reaching social and economic developments in the Soviet Union 
and the role of minorities in the construction of socialism. The main points covered included 
the situation of Polish labourers in the Soviet Union; the achievements of the Polish 





development of the village cooperative system; advances in women’s rights issues; the 
development of Polish national culture, schooling, book-publishing and literature; and the 
international relations of the Soviet Union (Pravda, July 14, 1929). A few days later, on 19 
July, another article appeared in Pravda, drawing an official line under the anti-Polish 
campaign. This was an appeal by the joint Soviet delegation of Poles entitled ‘To our Polish 
workers and peasants in the Soviet Union, in Poland and around the world’, that once again 
reiterated the jaded formulae about the rejection of the Soviet delegation, and Soviet Poles 
being ready to reject Polish fascist ideology and rally their forces to build a new socialist society 
(Pravda, July 19, 1929; Trybuna Radziecka, July 25, 1929). 
 
Conclusion 
When conceiving the idea for the First Congress of Polish representatives, its initiators had 
sought to ensure each and every Pole residing abroad that the newly re-emerged Polish state 
was committed to protecting their cultural and national rights, and ready to step in if those 
rights and freedoms were infringed. When the Congress finally opened its doors in 1929, its 
patrons representing the Republic’s highest political offices, called for those delegates to bear 
responsibility for the state and its growth. Poles abroad were viewed as part of their homeland 
insofar as they were eager to share its government’s policies and contribute to strengthening 
its position on the international stage. At the same time, Warsaw was prepared to abandon its 
ambitious plans for a world union of Poles if that endeavour did not guarantee the 
unquestionable support they were seeking.  
Pledging allegiance to Poland, however, was not always compatible with ensuring loyalty to 
one’s actual country of residence, as in the case of those governments that were in open or 
latent opposition to the Polish state. In the case of Lithuania, its government had severed all 
ties with Warsaw over Poland’s incorporation of Vilnius/Wilno in 1922. In the Soviet case, it 
was the mutually exclusive state ideologies that made the representation of the sizable Polish 
population residing within the Union’s borders impossible from the onset. 
The Congress of Poles abroad also served to nourish Soviet anti-Polish propaganda. Numerous 
accounts in the Soviet press appeared to validate the Soviet minority policy and the party’s 
claims of socialist victory. It was indeed the case that, by the early 1930s, the Polish national 
soviets, and especially the Polish Autonomous Region in Volhynia, could boast a better 





reading huts; and entertainment facilities, such as stationary and moving cinemas clubs and 
collective farmers’ houses (budynok kolhospnyka). However, despite these social and 
economic achievements, Poles remained alienated from the Soviet regime and were among the 
least engaged minority groups within the state-building process. According to an inspection of 
the Union’s national regions carried out in March 1931, the Polish national region lagged far 
behind other national districts and had the lowest rate of collectivisation – some 16 per cent, it 
only experienced a 1.8 per cent annual increase during the 1920s (TsDAVO, F.413, op.1, 
spr.552, ark.14). Similar shortcomings were recorded in January 1932 during the examination 
of Polish national village councils in three provinces: Iemilcheno, Novohrad-Volynskyi and 
Shepetivka. It was concluded that in those three regions, neither of the state campaigns 
(collectivisation, collection of grain and the mobilisation of funds) had been completed 
(TsDAVO, F.413, op.1, spr.552, ark.14).  
In the eyes of the authorities, the reason for such a low level of engagement in state initiatives 
were two-fold. First, the negative impact of ‘kurkul counter-revolutionary activities’; second, 
the insufficient development of party and mass-work among the Polish population (TsDAVO, 
F.413, op.1, spr.552, ark.14). One party official named Vyshnevsky, who conducted an 
inspection of the national districts, noted that he could not find any evidence that, among the 
various village councils, the Central Committee’s decision to implement collectivisation had 
even been discussed with its with poor and middle Polish peasants (TsDAVO, F.413, op.1, 
spr.552, ark.14). He summarised that the national soviets had failed to become Soviet 
strongholds on the ground, mobilise the poorer peasantry and guide the process of 
collectivisation and mass work. He also highlighted the widespread and unabating influence of 
the kurkuls and Catholic priests over the Polish population, especially their threatening of 
poorer Poles with the return of Piłsudski, who was prepared to execute all those who had joined 
the collective farms (TsDAVO, F.413, op.1, spr.552, ark.15-16). Although only depicting the 
situation in one particular locality, these conclusions were likely to have been equally true for 
the entirety of Soviet Ukraine. 
The discussion of the Warsaw Congress’s aims and the election of delegates was intended to 
mobilise the entire Polish population of Soviet Ukraine. Instead, beneath the thin veneer of 
Soviet propaganda that presented Soviet Poles as loyal citizens, it exposed the stark divide 
between the ideal image of the Union’s Polish minority as presented by the press, and those 
‘real’ Polish peasants who continued with their lives while despising Soviet state power. Many 





typically expressed escapism or indifference towards state matters, prioritising their own 
personal safety over any form of political involvement. Overall, they expressed a fear of, and 
a lack of faith in, the Soviet government, with many continuing to orient themselves towards 
Poland. 
The information and election campaign surrounding the Congress of Poles in Warsaw is a small 
episode in the interwar political rivalry between Poland and the Soviet Union, in which national 
minorities within the borders of each country were used as instruments to weaken the rival. 
Indeed, as suggested by the Pol’biuro’s secret report from 1927, the rejection of the Soviet 
delegation provided Moscow with even more benefits than its actual participation. At the macro 
level, the Congress gave enough material to produce almost one article a day in every major 
official newspaper, allowing the Soviet press to publicise the successes of the state’s minorities 
policies, the achievements of Poles of the Soviet Union and their comprehensive support for 
the construction of socialism. This was extremely important as it coincided with the launch of 
the first Five-Year plan, for which the party desperately required a loyal and committed 
workforce. Similarly, it provided the Soviet authorities with a great opportunity to present 
Poland in a negative light, as a country that not only oppressed and forcibly assimilate its 
national minorities, but cared little for almost 800,000 Poles living across its eastern border. 
This proved an important message during the ‘war scare’, both domestically and 
internationally.  
When viewed at the micro level, the election of delegates to the Warsaw Congress granted the 
Soviet Poles a voice, pushing them to publicly articulate positions and opinions regarding 
Soviet power they had not expressed so vocally before. By encouraging Poles to speak up, the 
campaign reinforced the view of the Polish population as less loyal to the revolution. Public 
opinion gathered during the election campaign proved that Poles were unable to be re-educated 
in the Soviet spirit leading, eventually, to the shift in the way those minority groups were treated 
by the authorities. Scholars (Iwanow, 1991; Petrov and Roginskii, 1997; and Martin 1998) 
agree that Poles would come to represent the first case of Soviet-led ethnic cleansing, and 
would become one of the first ‘enemy nations’ identified within the Soviet Union, whereby 
their national identity, shaped by the authorities own policies in the 1920s, was used as excuse 
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1 In 1928-29, it was called the Department of Agitation, Propaganda and Press. Otherwise, it was known as the 
Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the TsK VKP(b)  
2 The names of Soviet Poles are spelled in the Russian/Ukrainian orthography, as it was the case in the Soviet 
identity documents. Similarly, Polish transliteration is used for the names of Ukrainians and Belarusians 
residing in Poland. 
                                                            
